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Added to this, Japanese immigrants to the US were prohibited from naturalizing as American citizens. And by this time, anti-Asian sentiments were not limited to the West Coast. Co-sponsor of the immigration act was Senator James Aiken Reed, a prominent Pittsburgh attorney. Fourth, was Western foreign policy toward Japan. Britain and America, after a century of estrangement, realized in the course of defeating Germany that they had similar foreign policy interests. The two English-speaking powers engineered the Washington Treaty of , and the London Treaty of , the latter extending the naval armaments ratios for Japan, Britain and the US to other categories of ships, both to set up an overall security system in the Pacific AND to provide cover for Britain to terminate its alliance with Japan.

Under the old treaty, Britain had agreed to maintain neutrality if Japan and the US went to war. The Anglo-Americans reasoned that Japan would not need the alliance if it were part of a regional security arrangement. The cooperative policy worked in the s, largely because key politicians like Takahashi, and Hamaguchi Osachi and Shidehara Kijuro, leaders of the Minseito, the other major political party of the s, were committed to the Washington Treaty System.

By , reduced demand and thus reduced investment in new technology and facilities led to unemployment, underemployment and falling incomes everywhere. Worldwide, economies spiraled downward. Given the panoply of policy choices available in times of economic downturn, one is stunned to find that virtually every country in the world chose the wrong ones in the early s. Rather than increasing spending, governments raised taxes and import tariffs, and balanced budgets, which drove their economies more deeply into deflation and depression.

Japan, with Takahashi as its finance minister, was a rare exception.

Gurkha (World War II)

In the face of the severe economic crisis of the first half of the s, Takahashi undertook unprecedented exchange rate, monetary, and fiscal policies. He carried out a one-time devaluation of the yen to stimulate exports. He lowered interest rates and undertook deficit financing to stimulate domestic investment and demand.

Japan came out of the depression by , five years ahead of the United States. Several historians have written in recent years that the key political figure in Japan during the Inukai, Saito, and Okada cabinets, , was Takahashi Korekiyo, not the three prime ministers. Military officers plotted and carried out an invasion of Manchuria in September , and their actions met thunderous public applause at home.

The mass society that had brought Japan democracy in the s helped bring it something else in the s. The military killed or silenced the people who advocated cooperation—the threat of assassination was a powerful weapon for keeping opponents in line. Students of Japan have commented on how few voices spoke out against the rise of militarism, fascism if you want to use that word, in Japan in the s.

Even the socialists in the Diet e. It was with this in mind that the New York Times correspondent, Hugh Byas, entitled his book on Japan in the s, Government by Assassination : right wing or military terrorists murdered three of five prime ministers, and a fourth escaped only when young officers shot his brother-in-law by mistake; two of three finance ministers were killed, and the third died prematurely from ill health, thus avoiding the need for the military to assassinate him. He correctly predicted it would lead to economic stagnation, inflation, and worst of all, war with the United States.

The Tokyo and regional press frequently reported his anti-military rhetoric in this period during one cabinet meeting, for example, he told the army minister not to speak like an idiot, and in another he asked the same general if there were really idiots in the army who thought Japan could defeat the United States in a war.

The 30 greatest war novels of all time

The invasion of China was not planned aggression by the military high command—the war broke out over a skirmish between Chinese and Japanese troops in the suburbs of Beijing. What Japanese troops were doing in the suburbs of Beijing is another story. But the Japanese generals were wrong—in spite of unspeakable atrocities or maybe because of them , the Chinese soldiers fought well and over the next eight years, the Japanese military was unable to pacify China. One imagines Takahashi, as he looked down from the Buddhist Western Paradise, shuddering when he saw what his countrymen were doing.

The story of the transition from aggression in China in to the attack on Pearl Harbor is a complex one that includes an alliance with Germany and Italy—the alliance of the nations that believed they were excluded from full membership in the Western imperialist order--and the fall of France. But it is very important to keep in mind that the war in China was central to the Japanese decision to go to war with Britain and America. The answer they came up with was Anglo-American support of China. The way to defeat China was to cut off its supply lines from the West—in other words, move into Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.

There were other reasons that the Japanese army decided to move into French Indo-China, and then to attack the American, British and Dutch colonies—but one important reason was to outflank China, to cut off its connections with the allied powers. The Japanese Empire, Then there were the Jews who, as we have just mentioned, were still suffering horrendous anti-Semitism across the continent.

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They would rather be in Germany — the place that persecuted them in the first place — than go back to places they believed would continue to persecute them after the war. A lot of the displaced people were the same type of people who would be fighting if they had been in Ukraine. The idea of going back is the worst thing they can think of.

They went everywhere. Lots went to Canada, the United States and Australia. Hundreds of thousands of Poles ended up coming to Britain. Many of the Jews were helped by Zionists to get into Palestine. I chose this because I think it really epitomises the vengeance that took place against Germans in Germany in the aftermath of the war. She was repeatedly raped by Russian soldiers.

She eventually manages to protect herself by getting together with a high-ranking Soviet officer — that was the only way she could prevent the junior soldiers from attacking her repeatedly. So not only has she had this horrific experience but she is then abandoned by the man that she loves. This was a subject that everybody knew about but nobody talked about for years and years.

There was a very influential German television documentary that was shown in the s where women came forward for the first time to talk about their experiences. It was very controversial. All sorts of German academics came out and said this was a dangerous development and that once Germans started to think of themselves as being victims of the war they might lose sight of the fact that they were also the perpetrators of it.

There is a sense of it being unspoken because of that. But there was also a complete double standard between the way men and women were allowed to talk about the war. Norman Lewis was a prolific 20th century travel writer who had many eminent fans. Do you want to tell us more about it?

This was the first area of Europe to be liberated so it was the first sight the Allies had of what they were dealing with, which was pretty chaotic.

Naples in was a city in meltdown. First and foremost, there was no food at all. Children would dig up grass from the roadside to take home to eat. People would do anything to get hold of some food — literally anything. Norman Lewis repeatedly had men approach him trying to press the favours of their wives and their daughters upon him in return for a hot meal. The mafia is still there. The mafia was, to a degree, reinstated by the Allies when they arrived.

They wanted to avoid complete chaos so they installed people who looked like they had authority. In some cases that meant keeping the fascists on board, in other cases it meant reinstalling the mafia people who the fascists had got rid of years earlier. When the Allies arrived they were like gods. They had unlimited access to food, money and cigarettes and all the things that the local people were craving.

The corruption that brought with it was every bit as bad as the home-grown corruption. Some of the stories of Allied soldiers lining up with tins of food to hand over to women they are going to sleep with are quite chilling. The Forest Brothers is the name given to the partisans in the Baltic states. Can you can give us some background on them? If you were in Ukraine, the Baltic states, and in bits of Poland, the war began for you not when the Germans invaded but when the Soviet Union invaded — in areas of Poland in and the Baltic states in So the fact that Germans took over most of Europe subsequently is kind of neither here nor there because the war ends with the Soviets still in control.

So when the war came to an end for most of Europe in these partisans carried on fighting in units in the forests all the way into the s. He was a Lithuanian student in when the Soviets re-entered his country. He and his family were staunch nationalists and they joined a group of partisans in order to try to fight against the Soviets.

Initially it was all organised by the Lithuanian army, so they had huge units of men hiding in the woods conducting ambushes on Soviet troops. But they were no match for the Red Army and they started suffering some really terrible defeats. They then reorganised themselves into little partisan cells hiding out in little bunkers dotted around the woodlands.

For years and years they fought this clandestine battle against the might of the Red Army. It reminds me of stories of the French resistance during the war. One of the really poignant things about the story is that he left Lithuania at the end of in order to inform the West about what was happening in his country.

He travelled through all the border regions, travelling by night and hiding in the woods by day, and finally made his way through to the West. He also fell in love with a woman there. It could have all ended happily for him had he stayed in the West. Civil Military Relations. Kriegsberichterstattung, Kriegsberichterstatter. Prisoners in War. Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. World War II.

Japan, the United States, and the Road to World War II in the Pacific 日本、合衆国、および第二次世界大戦太平洋戦局への道

Warfare — The article evaluates the degree to which the Second World War was responsible for the development of Europe since It seeks to disentangle effects that were clearly directly due to the war from those which can be seen as the result of changes already affecting pre-war Europe, and those due to post-war developments, such as the Cold War and the European Union. It examines the relationship between long term social, economic and cultural developments and the impact of the war and political turning points.

That great events have great effects seems a truism and it would follow that the Second World War, a conflict which caused a colossal loss of life, saw a continent divided as mighty armies strove for supremacy, and ended with much of Europe in ruins and the rest impoverished, must have had a transforming effect. Few would deny that the great context for the development of Europe, politically, socially and economically, in the immediate post-war years was the war, but did it really transform Europe and, if so, for how long?

Among the problems in assessing the changes to Europe, its nations, societies, economies and cultures, that may or may not be seen as consequent upon the war is the perennial historian's dilemma in distinguishing between short and long term developments. Many of the changes that seem at first sight to have been due to the conflict and its aftermath may well have been simply the further effects of salient developments evident before the war.

Then, of course, the impact of the war varied considerably as between the defeated and the victorious states, and indeed between combatants and neutrals, the latter providing a "control" for any assessment of the war's effects. Post-war Germany and Poland looked very different in, say, to what they had been in , but can the same be said for Sweden or, for that matter, Spain?

An essay on this subject written in, shall we say, , or , would have a very different perspective, for many of changes made by the war were far from permanent and, arguably, post-war developments had a greater effect. This is most obviously the case when we consider the redrawing of the map of Europe in the immediate post war period.

The war ended with what in historical terms was an odd peace, for there was no peace treaty with Germany, 1 in part because the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers had left no authority to conclude peace with, and also because of the disintegration of the alliance of the victorious powers shortly after the moment of victory. Nevertheless, states Estonia , Latvia and Lithuania disappeared, frontiers were changed, and, most importantly, the division of Germany into occupied zones provided the blueprint for the emergence of two German states.

In general, East Central Europe moved west, in terms of frontier changes, seen most evidently in those of Poland, which lost territory to the Soviet Union and gained it at the expense of what had been Germany, and because of the movement of millions of people, expelled from their homes and moving west in search of security. There was also a movement in the opposite direction as Latvians and other Baltic people and numerous other ethnic groups, such as Crimean Tartars, were forcibly moved eastwards by the Soviet authorities.

A feature of the post settlement was thus, if settlement is not an inappropriate term, the brutal displacement of populations. Whereas the Versailles Settlement had attempted to make frontiers coincide with national or ethnic divisions, the aftermath of the Second World War saw peoples made to fit frontiers. In particular, millions of Germans were expelled from East Prussia and other German territory ceded to Poland, and from the Sudetenland , while there were parallel movements of Poles from the territories ceded to the Soviet Union into that gained from Germany.

Although the fate of Eastern and Central Europe was largely decided at Yalta in February , the future political shape of the continent was formally agreed at Potsdam , 17 July to 2 August , where the Allied leaders decided that there should be an inter-allied council to co-ordinate the four occupied zones of Germany and agreed that Austria should be independent, France be returned Alsace-Lorraine , and Czechoslovakia the Sudetenland, and that Poland's western frontier should be the Oder-Neisse Line previously the Curzon and then the Molotov-Ribbentrop Line. The palimpsest of the arrangements was distinct in and discernible in or even the late s, when troops of the wartime allies still garrisoned Berlin , but by , after the implosion of the Soviet Union, the "velvet" revolutions in the satrap people's republics, and the reunification of Germany, the map of Europe resembled that in the wake of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March , rather more than that of , though the end of Yugoslavia and recent events in the Ukrainian Republic remind us that political geography is rarely permanent; a hundred-year-old inhabitant of Lviv will have been an Austro-Hungarian , a Polish, a Soviet, and a Ukrainian national during his or her lifetime.

We must also consider the view that the two World Wars should not necessarily be treated as autonomous but perhaps be seen as parts of a single conflict, a "Thirty Years War" of the twentieth century, 2 a conflict that arose from the long-term political and economic rivalries of great powers and Europe's fault lines which led these rivalries to ignite into warfare. It is, indeed, possible to argue that the Cold War period can be seen as at least a sequel to it.

Such an interpretation of the dark history of Europe in the twentieth century does, of course, downgrade the importance of ideology and of the "great dictators" and has been attacked on the grounds that the coming to power of Adolf Hitler — was, not only the major cause of World War II, but that his hysterical and paranoid agenda gave that war its own unique and horrific nature. Nevertheless, the outcome of the Second World War and the nature of the fracturing alliance that triumphed was clearly the major factor in determining, in political-geographic respects, the map of post-war Europe.

Its impact was clearly discernible for nearly half a century, although we can debate whether it was the position of the armies of the western powers vis-a-vis the Red Army in or the subsequent announcement of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan in , the formation of NATO in , or the entry of West Germany into the alliance in that decisively made for a divided Europe.

In that the division was also an ideological one, it determined the nature of economies and societies. It is, however, when we come to the economic and social effects of the war upon Europe, that determining the degrees and the ways in which the experience of the war as well as its outcome shaped the post-war world becomes difficult. The major problem is that of distinguishing between pre-war influences, the experience of the war, its result, and the Cold War, which followed so swiftly. The relentless advance of Allied forces in and achieved a victory, so complete as to prevent any revival of the defeated regimes.

Although celebrated with justice by the victors, it was gained at an enormous cost to all of Europe. The excesses of the Soviet forces, which raped and looted their way through eastern Germany are now well known, 4 but for many years this went unrecognised by western writers. If the conduct of the western Allies was far superior, total war cannot be waged without leaving desolation and a huge loss of civilian life in its wake and, what one author has called, "collective amnesia", 5 has obscured the costs of liberation as armies fought their way through France, Belgium and Holland. Europe in offered a picture of desolation and ruin.

Parts of the Soviet Union had been fought over three times, while Poland had suffered aggression from both Germany and Russia in and the Soviet advance in had paused only to allow the German army to destroy Warsaw. Central Europe has been described as a "lunar landscape dotted with enormous heaps of rubble and bomb craters", 6 while, in Berlin, "Ninety-five per cent of its urban area lay in ruins".

Victorious but battered, Britain was, a threadbare and austere country with an exhausted economy, now that American aid was withdrawn, and the French economy was dislocated: "food was scarce in the winter of , and there were virtually no reserves of gold or foreign currency". Two European civil wars or one punctuated by a lengthy armistice had not only resulted in the problems of reconstruction, but had substantially reduced the power and influence of the major European states with the exception of Russia, long perceived in western and central Europe as largely an extra-European power, but one whose armies had penetrated deep into Central Europe in much as they had done in As the Cold War developed, it became clear that only two powers in the world had emerged from the war with enhanced strength and that these two "super powers" were the USA and the Soviet Union or USSR.

A further weakening of the position of Europe came with the diminuendo of the colonial empires of Britain, France and the Netherlands. The stress and expense of war and of humiliation at the hands of Japan had already impacted severely upon the positions of the imperial powers, while the opposition of the USA and of the emergent United Nations to colonial possessions was a further factor.

Winston Churchill — [ ] had, perhaps, failed to realise or had ignored the anti-colonial implications of the Atlantic Charter, which he and Franklin D. Roosevelt — [ ] had signed in , or the strength of American opposition to empires. US policy was, nevertheless, ambiguous as anti-imperialism could conflict with its Cold War interests; having refused to back Britain during the Suez crisis in , it proceeded to press her to retain bases of strategic importance, as with Cyprus and Diego Garcia.

The process of decolonisation set in, sometimes "with astonishing — and in some cases excessive speed", as with the British Empire, 9 at a single blow with the Dutch Empire, collapse and precipitate withdrawal as with the Belgian Empire, or accompanied by a hard and lengthy struggle as with France's wars in Vietnam and Algeria , 10 but it was practically complete by the early s. Essentially the imperial powers lost the appetite and will to hold on to empires, which were no longer seen as worthwhile by their home electorates.

As Mark Mazower born has commented, "imperial powers were rarely forced to retreat as a direct result of military insurrection — Algeria was the exception rather than the rule". Britain, at first sought a substitute for Empire in the Commonwealth, but was then to waver between Atlanticism and Europe, while France, hastily, turned its attention towards Europe and followed a policy of forming a close relationship with West Germany. The physical and economic recovery of Europe was, despite the enormous damage done to the infrastructure, industry, agriculture and commerce, to be quicker than most observers expected and that of Western Europe was spectacular after the bleak and austere immediate post-war years.

It has been argued that it was the depths to which Germany had sunk in , the near-starvation, disorder and hopelessness that inspired a West German recovery that prioritised economic recovery stability, and order, 12 while another view is that it was a determined effort to erase the past. These developments were underpinned by different economic and social systems and, if in part the result of the war and differing national traditions, were also consequent on America's aid to the West via the Marshall Plan. A salient feature of the recovering Europe has been identified as the increased role of the state as director of economies and, via increased taxation and state welfare, of civil societies and the organisation and direction of states for the war effort has been held to be a major influence on these developments.

A little disputed effect of total war is that it vastly increases the power of governments and both governments and peoples had become accustomed to, respectively, positions of command and dependency.

Whether these post-war developments represented a continuation of war-time systems of government, had already been evident in pre-war Europe, or were largely a response to the problems of a ravaged Europe can be debated. The more extreme forms of state control of economic and social life experienced by the states of Eastern and Central Europe may be seen as imported from, or imposed by, the Soviet Union, though many of these states had formerly been used to a high degree of government direction and were experiencing some of the worst problems of post-war dislocation and poverty.

Central to the recovery of Western Europe was a balance or synthesis between liberal capitalism and socialism, though in France and Italy this was challenged by powerful Communist Parties, strengthened by the Resistance movements which had developed late in the war. The general direction of governments' policies was contested between social democratic and moderate conservative parties, but moved steadily towards the latter from the early s.

Whether the Cold War divide, the formation of the Soviet Bloc and the imposition of socialist one party economic and political systems of government on much of East Central Europe was planned by Joseph Stalin — from the beginning has been much debated. Anne Applebaum born , Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe has, more recently, provided support for this thesis. Certainly the take-over of the Baltic States had already provided a taste of what was to come, while Communist parties in states overrun by Russian forces clearly expected full support for their seizure of power.

Against this interpretation, there is Stalin's apparent flexibility in making his "back of an envelope" Percentage Agreement with Churchill, while Mark Mazower has queried whether over Italy and Poland there was not, "at the highest levels, a tacit quid pro quo? Blueprint or not, the fact remains that, one by one, socialist states, closely allied to the Soviet Union or "people's democracies" emerged: Bulgaria , where from a Communist-dominated Fatherland Front was the only legal political group; Poland and Romania, where a strong parallel state was dominated by Communists; and Hungary and Czechoslovakia, where, until , a limited degree of democracy was permitted.

Some have argued that the timetable of the Soviet takeover was dependent on Stalin's reactions to US policies - the ending of aid to the Soviet Union, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan -but there are good reasons for believing that whatever flexibility he demonstrated elsewhere, as in Greece , Stalin was determined to place sympathetic governments and economic systems in the countries "liberated" by the Soviet forces.